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ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
System Architecting 
An Analysis Method for Conceptual Design of Complexity and Autonomy in Complex Space 
System Architectures  
Brandon C. Wood, 2001 
 
Recent research by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Space Systems Laboratory has 
demonstrated a system engineering and architecting framework that enables the creation and quantitative 
comparison of numerous, unique space system architectures. The foundation for this method is the belief 
that all satellite systems are information disseminators that can be represented as information transfer 
networks. This paper uses that work as a foundation and addresses its inadequacy in accounting for the 
more difficult to quantify operational issues associated with space systems. The Lean Aerospace 
Initiative, in concert with the Space Systems, Policy, and Architecture Research Center, supported this 
research. 
 
The first phase of this research involved a series of structured interviews with major civil, defense, and 
commercial satellite manufactures. System engineers, at a variety of organizational levels, were 
questioned about the current set of techniques used to evaluate spacecraft command and control system 
designs. In addition, data was collected on how operational concerns were addressed in the conceptual 
and preliminary design phases of development. This results shows that operational issues, although 
beginning to play a significant role in preliminary space system design, do not play a significant role in 
conceptual space system design. These interviews supported the development of an operations 
complexity metric that can be used to evaluate intelligent command and control schemes in complex, 
multi-satellite space systems. 
 
A space mission was studied, in the second phase of this research, using the previously demonstrated 
system engineering and architecting framework but with the inclusion of the new operations complexity 
metric to compare different architectures. The space system’s mission was to collect data on ionospheric 
disturbances for use in ionospheric weather forecasting. A computer model was developed that produced 
a frontier of optimal space system architectures given the specific objectives of the satellite constellation. 
 
This effort has developed and demonstrated an operations complexity metric to expand the viability of 
quantitative space architecture analysis. This metric is robust enough to accommodate advanced 
command and control technology, such as software agents, that are poised to revolutionize space 
operations and enable highly autonomous constellations of satellites. The use of the metric showed that it 
quantified operational issues with relatively easily collectable data, minimized misinterpretation of the 
design method, and relied on reasonable assumptions. 
 
 A Partitioning Methodology for Helicopter Avionics System with a focus on Life Cycle Cost 
Leon M. Silva, 2001 
 
Traditional system engineering methods rely on decomposition for establishing system partitions. As one 
of the key responsibilities of a system architect, the decisions made with respect to how an avionics 
system is partitioned play a significant role in the system’s Life Cycle Cost (LCC). Despite this, most of 
the decomposition methods available focus on managing the complexity of the system with respect to the 
architect’s ability to understand the system. In other words, the method is designed to keep the 
complexity of the system below the architect’s inherent threshold limit of understanding. Given the impact 
that the partitioning process has on the system’s LCC, it seems appropriate to derive a methodology that 
takes into consideration not only complexity but also other critical factors. 
 
A framework was developed in order to quantify and compare the reliability and maintainability of five 
different helicopter avionics system architectures. The information was extracted from actual data 
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collected during the maintenance of the five helicopter systems used by the US Government over a 
period of two years. Based on these five case studies, a set of partitioning criteria was developed that can 
be used in future programs in order to improve the LCC of the system. 
 
The methodology provides a process whereby the analysis of maintenance data can assist the system 
architect in making better architecting decisions. The process identified some compelling issues with 
respect to data available in this area. There are significant limitations in the current maintenance 
infrastructure that need to be resolved to a greater extent before this method can be more generally 
applied. The process also identified some additional factors that have an impact on the LCC. The most 
compelling was that of legacy subsystems that offer significant problems with respect to their partitioning 
due to the fact that they are more entrenched in the current avionics market. 
 
 Chains of Function Delivery: A Role for Product Architecture in Concept Design 
Timothy W. Cunningham, 1998 
 
This research intends to improve three areas of team performance in concept design: the team’s 
understanding and recognition of the product architecture, the team’s ability to document integration 
issues and risks, and the team’s ability to judge whether a product concept is worthy of further pursuit. 
Many of the high-impact decisions made in concept design revolve around integration issues: how the 
product’s physical elements work together to deliver the performance characteristics, or functions. The 
product architecture, a singularly important characteristic of the product, is in great part determined by the 
mapping of the product’s functions to the physical elements that deliver those functions. Integration 
issues pose a unique kind of integration risk: the chance that adequately designed individual elements will 
not function properly when connected to form the product, or cannot be assembled and debugged easily 
and quickly. During concept design, a development team must recognize integration issues in the 
functional-physical mapping so they can assess the associated integration risk, and judge their concepts 
on this basis. Since information is weak and fragmented during concept design, performing a formal 
analysis of the problem is a significant challenge.  
 
In addressing this problem, the thesis begins with an explanation of the conflicts between the design 
theory representations of how architecture is created and real issues faced in product development. 
Specifically, many decisions encountered by a multi-disciplinary development team are made in the 
physical domain and influence the decomposition, altering the functional-physical mapping. Because the 
theory does not allow for physical decomposition, this part of the mapping goes undetected in current 
approaches. Integration issues and conflicts often result. This thesis expands the current theory by 
creating a framework for architecture that allows for decomposition choices of this type. 
 
Given this theoretical framework, two themes are explored. First, a systematic procedure for identifying 
integration issues in mechanical assemblies is developed. The procedure captures chains: graphical 
representations of how product-level attributes are delivered, depicted on a hierarchy of the physical 
elements. Chains, which differ for each concept and decomposition, show 1) which functions are 
delivered in integral fashion, and 2) which elements play a role in delivering each function. Represented 
graphically, chains can help the multi-disciplinary team relate the diverse technical and non-technical 
influences on decomposition and architecture. 
Metrics can then be applied to reveal the integration issues and integration risk associated with many, 
potentially conflicting chains. The research applies established part locating mathematics in the 
procedure, expanding the utility of this existing idea by applying it to concept design. Second, the thesis 
develops a method for conducting a chain analysis of candidate concepts and decompositions, creating a 
framework for trade-offs in the context of architecture. The method and chain procedure and metrics are 
tested on a real, complex, integral product, the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter military aircraft, to 
assess their utility. 
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 Requirements Engineering 
Best Practices In User Needs/Requirements Generation 
Joseph Robert Wirthlin,  2000 
 
An idealized process framework for the front-end of product development was developed. The framework 
covers the process space from an initial need (or recognition of a need) to the decision for a 
product/development program launch. The framework focuses on the activities required for the 
development of requirements needed for a business case decision. The framework was developed 
through a thorough examination of the literature relating to product development and addresses not only 
the activities required to traverse the front-end of product development, but also metrics and a process 
maturity matrix by which an organization’s process can be evaluated. 
 
Using case studies of the front-end processes of eight commercial organizations and eight military 
organizations in addition to the US Air Force, the applicability of the framework was tested. All of the 
organizations demonstrated the existence of the four fundamental activities contained in the framework 
but a discussion of the existing process enablers revealed various interpretations of required features. 
The maturity matrix was used to evaluate each of the organizations (commercial and military) relative to 
an idealized and mature front-end process. The analysis revealed a significant gap between commercial 
and military process performance. Additionally, the existence and application of the process enablers was 
significantly correlated with the organization’s performance in the four process activities of the front-end 
framework. 
 
The implications of the research indicate that military organizations in general will need to reevaluate the 
current practices in the front-end and the application of process enablers within their organizations. 
Further, military organizations should reexamine if the current process structure for system development 
in the front-end needs significant changes. 
 
Identifying Lean Practices for Deriving Software Requirements 
Brian J. Ippolito, 2000 
 
Lean principles focus on employing value added activities to reduce product development cycle time, 
increase quality, and reduce cost. Lean originated in the automotive industry and has since been 
centered in the manufacturing domain. Lessons learned on implementing Lean initiatives have been 
captured by the in the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) and incorporated into the Lean Enterprise Model 
(LEM) (http://lean.mit.edu/public/index.html). To the author’s knowledge, this is the first research effort 
specifically designed to apply the Lean principles and the Lean Enterprise Model to the aerospace 
software requirement derivation process. 
 
Data supporting this research is the result of a comprehensive two-year research effort involving three 
detailed case studies with 45 case study interviews, 125 stakeholder surveys collected from ten 
aerospace software upgrades, feedback from numerous aerospace industry practitioners and 
Massachusetts Institute of technology (MIT) faculty. 
 
Ten aerospace software upgrades were analyzed at both an enterprise level and an organizational level 
to identify the presence of Lean practices. At the enterprise level, metrics typically used to measure 
enterprise performance (Flow Time, Stakeholder Satisfaction, Quality Yield, and Resource Utilization) 
were found to be appropriate for the software requirement process but not adequately implemented. An 
organizational analysis observed five of the twelve Lean practices as effectively implemented and 
identified opportunities to implement four more Lean practices. 
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Identifying the Impact of Modeling and Simulation in the Generation of System Level 
Requirements 
Myles A. Walton, 1999 
 
Requirements generation is an influential time in the evolution of the program. It allocates 70% of the life-
cycle cost of a program and is responsible for a large percentage of the system errors and cost overruns. 
This project lays the framework of the current state of requirements generation and then focuses on the 
use of modeling and simulation within the process. It is shown that although modeling and simulation 
tools are being used extensively in requirements generation in many programs throughout the DoD, their 
effectiveness is largely undocumented and areas of high leverage are unknown. Research results also 
indicate that the more effective use of M&S within requirements generation could be achieved with 
increased tool interoperability and easier tool validation and verification. Finally, the ability to perform 
more iteration early and M&S use as a boundary object for communication are set forth as the two main 
benefits of M&S. 
Integration Testing 
Opportunities for Lean Thinking in Aircraft Flight Testing and Evaluation  
Carmen Carreras, 2002 
 
The application of Lean principles and practices has been shown to help aerospace companies reduce 
waste and maximize value to help meet the changing demands of the market. The most visible area of 
influence has been manufacturing, where great strides have been made in cost and cycle time reduction. 
Recently, the flight testing community has been faced with similar challenges. This paper investigates 
whether Lean principles can be applied to aircraft flight testing and evaluation to help meet these goals. 
Specific objectives are to identify opportunities for the implementation of Lean thinking and establish a 
framework for structured implementation of Lean principles and practices. 
 
This study focuses on seven aircraft programs: 737-NG, 767-400, Hawker Horizon, F-22, F/A-18E/F, C-
130J, and the T-6A. The programs are analyzed from a programmatic viewpoint to identify where lean 
practices are currently being used and how lean thinking could further improve the overall flight testing 
process. Additionally, a detailed examination is performed on the day-to-day activities to identify the daily 
sources of waste and their impact on the program. The detailed analysis focuses on flutter testing as a 
surrogate for the entire testing program. A total of 90 flights were analyzed. 
 
Data collected from the case studies fits well into the value-creation framework established in Lean 
Enterprise Value. Each of the phases of the framework – value identification, value proposition, and value 
delivery – are discussed as they relate to flight testing. Many examples of the application of lean 
principles and practices as well as opportunities for implementation are presented in the value delivery 
phase. Opportunities were identified in: coordination of the systems engineering value stream, 
coordination with other test aircraft and necessary support functions, and management of the daily test 
operations. 
 
This preliminary study indicates that Lean thinking can be applied to flight testing. The guiding principles 
of well-run testing programs paralleled those of Lean. Additionally, there are many instances where Lean 
thinking would provide an opportunity to eliminate waste and improve efficiency. 
Trade Study Analysis  
Tools for Evolutionary Acquisition: A Study of Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) 
Applied to the Space Based Radar (SBR)  
Timothy J. Spaulding, 2003 
 
The Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) process was applied to the Space Based Radar 
(SBR), a space system under study by the United States Air Force. A system-level model of possible 
SBR architectures was created using data and analysis from previous high-level studies. Competing 
designs were evaluated through MATE’s universal utility metric. 
Compiled by: Lean Aerospace Initiative  
Research Group at MIT  
 
June 2004 – version 5.0 7 
 
The MATE model was qualitatively compared against a high-level design study and MATE’s advantages 
were noted, specifically its ability to trace modeling assumptions and present a holistic view of the space 
of competing designs. A quantitative comparison revealed significant differences between MATE’s 
recommended system design and that of the comparison high-level study. 
 
The potential for a simplification of the MATE method was explored through the use of several 
approximations to revealed user preferences. Comparisons were made through both a proportional utility 
loss metric and a general Spearman’s Rho rank order correlation. Using these measures it was shown 
that while a linear or subjective approximation to utility curves resulted in excessive errors, and 
approximation to weighting relationships did not. 
 
Finally, MATE’s potential applicability to the Air Force acquisition process was studied. In general MATE 
was shown to be useful to any acquisition effort that derives its benefit from a networked approach and is 
of sufficient technical complexity as to make tradeoff decisions opaque to casual analysis. Specifically, 
MATE was shown to be useful in the analysis of alternatives process as well as an aid to early milestone 
sourcing decisions. 
 Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration and its Application to Evolutionary Acquisition  
Jason E. Derleth, 2003 
 
The Air Force has recently embraced Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) as its acquisition strategy of choice. 
EA is an especially difficult method of acquisition and presents some extraordinary challenges at the 
system engineering level. 
 
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) is a tool at the system engineer’s toolbox that can provide 
some focus on a project in EA. MATE, a tool initially developed by Adam Ross and Nathan Diller at MIT, 
is a method of developing models to simulate the product user’s preferences for the attributes of a design. 
Once these preferences are well known, they can be used to guide the design choice. 
 
The design choice is further guided by the creation of system level computer models that represent the 
design choices available to the engineer. These choices are then varied systematically to create a 
“tradespace” of possible designs. This tradespace exhaustively enumerates all of the possible design 
choices for the engineer. Then, through the preference models previously developed, each possible 
design is ranked in order of user utility and cost. The result can be graphed, giving a visual representation 
of the utility and cost of literally thousands of architectures in a single glance. 
 
This thesis shows that MATE is a useful tool for a systems engineer working on an EA system. There are 
many benefits to the use of MATE in EA, including but not limited to: a better understanding of the end 
user’s desires and requirements for the system; the ability to optimize the system for the first evolution; 
the possibility of understanding what will become optimal in later evolutions; quick redesign time if 
circumstances or preferences change; and further insight into systems level considerations.  
 
In addition to showing some of the benefits of MATE, this thesis furthers the application of MATE itself 
into systems not involved with space. Previously all applications of MATE had been concerned with space 
systems. 
 
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration with Concurrent Design as a Value-Centric Framework for 
Space System Architecture and Design  
Adam M. Ross, 2003  
 
The complexity inherent in space systems necessarily requires intense expenditures of resources both 
human and monetary. The high level of ambiguity present in the early design phases of these systems 
causes long, highly iterative, and costly design cycles, especially due to the need to create robust 
systems that are inaccessible after deployment. This thesis looks at incorporating decision theory 
methods into the early design processes to streamline communication of wants and needs among 
stakeholders and between levels of design. Communication channeled through formal utility interviews 
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and analysis enables engineers to better understand the key drivers for the system and allows for a broad 
and more thorough exploration of the design tradespace. 
 
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE), an evolving process incorporating decision theory into 
model and simulation-based design, has been applied to several space system projects. The conclusions 
of these studies indicate that this process can improve the quality of communication to more quickly 
resolve project ambiguity, and enable the engineer to discover better value designs for multiple 
stakeholders. Sets of design options, as opposed to point designs, in addition to the structure of the 
solution space can be analyzed and communicated through the output of this process. 
 
MATE is also being integrated into a concurrent design environment to facilitate the transfer of knowledge 
of important drivers into higher fidelity design phases. Formal utility theory provides a mechanism to 
bridge the language barrier between experts of different backgrounds and differing needs (e.g. scientists, 
engineers, managers, etc). MATE with Concurrent Design (MATE-CON) couples decision makers more 
closely to the design, and most importantly, maintains their presence between formal reviews. The 
presence of a MATE-CON chair in the concurrent design environment represents a unique contribution of 
this process. In addition to the development of the process itself, this thesis uses Design Structure Matrix 
(DSM) analysis to compare the structure of the MATE-CON process to that of the NASA systems 
engineering process and that of a U.S. space company to gain insights into their relative temporal 
performance. Through both qualitative and quantitative discussions, the MATE-CON process, which is 
derived from the fundamental concept of engineering, is shown to be a “better” method for delivering 
value to key decision makers. 
Decision Analysis 
Space Launch Operations and Capacity Modeling: A System Dynamics Methodology for 
Advanced Analysis of the U.S. Eastern Range 
David H.W. Steare, 2000 
 
A prototype computer model was developed to assess the feasibility and potential benefits of a system 
dynamics approach to calculating space launch operational constraints and range capacity. This research 
effort concentrated on modeling the U.S. Eastern Range. The current U.S. Air Force Range Capacity 
Model served as a modeling framework, upon which significant enhancements of analysis capability and 
fidelity were achieved. Improvements realized by the system dynamics methodology are due to a 
fundamental transition in modeling technique from a deterministic spreadsheet approach, as utilized by 
the Air Force, to a more realistic simulation platform. The system dynamics model produces a 
probabilistic distribution of values rather than a single point solution and does not require the input of an 
annual launch manifest. 
 
In addition to developing an improved modeling methodology, two analyses of Eastern Range operating 
conditions were conducted for fiscal year 2001. The first analysis examined the expected operating 
conditions. The second analysis focused on operating the range under a maximum launch capacity 
scenario. In comparison to the 30 launches scheduled on the Eastern Range manifest, simulation results 
suggest range launch capacity as a distribution of values between 49 and 54 launches, with a mean value 
of 51 launches. Even though the FY01 launch manifest will not utilize the maximum capacity of the range, 
the model predicts that launch programs will still collectively endure approximately 2,500 calendar hours 
of wait time before range resources are available to fulfill all requests for range support. The following six 
range constraint categories were modeled as the primary causes of the unavailability of range support 
resources: 1) range crew rest, 2) planned restricted periods, 3) range lockdown, 4) rescheduling impact, 
5) unexpected range systems maintenance, and 6) single major operation support capability. Range crew 
rest was determined to have the largest detrimental impact to launch operations efficiency for both the 
FY01 expected operating conditions and the launch capacity scenario. The relative impacts of the 
remaining five categories were observed to fluctuate depending on the number of launches and resulting 
congestion of range operations. 
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System/Product Design 
Stakeholder Collaboration in Air Force Acquisition: Adaptive Design Using System 
Representations  
Robert E. Dare, 2003 
 
Air Force development of new or evolutionary weapon systems is a complex endeavor due to the involvement of 
many stakeholders and the presence of considerable uncertainty in the acquisition environment. The ability to 
adapt a weapon system while it is still being designed affords a means to respond to this complexity. The 
fundamental motivation for this research is to discover how Air Force development programs, operating within 
established constraints, can improve their adaptability during the design phase to provide more value to the 
warfighter.  
 
The thesis of this research is that the quality and nature of collaboration between stakeholders during the design 
phase of weapon system development programs determines how effectively they share knowledge, which in turn 
drives the level of program adaptability.  
 
Eight case studies were conducted on Air Force development programs. Data were collected on collaborative 
practices and patterns of adaptability demonstrated during design. The research placed an emphasis on usage of 
“system representations” such as prototypes and beta software releases that acted as a form of boundary object to 
facilitate knowledge sharing across organizational boundaries.  
 
As programs used system representations to provide higher levels of knowledge sharing, they were found to be 
more adaptable. System representations were more effective at promoting adaptability when they represented the 
design with higher fidelity, providing system-level detail and covering stakeholder emphasis areas. Lastly, certain 
key stakeholder roles were found to contribute both flexibility and structure, facilitating a “zone of novelty” in which 
the stakeholders could exercise creativity and evaluate design options while still executing the program within 
established constraints.  
 
This research indicates that the pressing need for Air Force programs to be able to adapt in today’s uncertain 
acquisition environment can be addressed to a significant degree through the usage of effective system 
representations in conjunction with supporting patterns of stakeholder interaction. Specific recommendations for 
Air Force acquisition policy makers and practitioners are provided.  
 
Strategies for Dealing with Instabilities in a Complex, Multi-Project Product Development System 
Engineering Environment 
Michael R. Wright, 2003 
 
This thesis evaluates the product development process from the perspective of a multiple gas turbine 
engine development programs. The risk to meeting cost and schedule requirements has increased solely 
due to squeezing budgets and schedule to fit the "better, faster, cheaper" mold. The thesis focuses on the 
further risks to cost and schedule of the gas turbine product development cycle that are caused by 
instabilities introduced by the cyclical nature of multiple product development programs completing the 
cycle and new ones starting. Market and business factors influence the numbers of cycles and can not be 
controlled. Workload and resource-usage are not stabile within multiple product development cycles. 
 
A Decomposition-Based Approach for the Integration of Product Development and Manufacturing 
System Design  
Yong-Suk Kim, 2002 
Using a structured approach to understand the interaction between product design decisions and 
manufacturing system design is critical to reflect manufacturing system issues early in the product 
development process. Early consideration of manufacturing system issues prevents product design 
iterations due to manufacturing system constraints or unnecessary manufacturing system design 
modification to accommodate new product designs. However, in academia and industry, few frameworks 
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are available to capture the interaction between manufacturing system design and product design 
decisions. 
 
This thesis presents an approach to capture the interaction between manufacturing system design and 
product design decisions, which is called manufacturability evaluation process. The manufacturability 
evaluation process aims to guide product development teams to see the effects of their design decisions 
on manufacturing systems and thus, to make the right decision from the early stage of product 
development. The manufacturability evaluation process satisfies four objectives: 1) to describe the 
objectives of manufacturing systems clearly separated from the means of achievement, 2) to present the 
impact of various design decisions on the achievement of the objectives of manufacturing systems, 3) to 
provide a common platform to effectively communicate the impact across the organization, and 4) to 
provide a framework to put existing tools together to integrate manufacturing system design and product 
design. The manufacturability evaluation process is based on a recently developed Manufacturing 
System Design Decomposition (MSDD). 
 
This thesis describes three groups of case studies to identify industry practices and provide application 
examples of the proposed manufacturability evaluation process. The manufacturability evaluation process 
has been successfully applied to the cases. In addition, the interaction between manufacturing system 
design and product design decisions are discussed with industry case study examples in the automotive 
industry. An evaluation tool is developed to evaluate the general practices of a company ensuring the 
manufacturability of product designs. Furthermore, this thesis provides a basis for future research to 
extend the scope of the MSDD into product development areas. 
 
A Framework for Achieving Lifecycle Value in Product Development 
Alexis Stanke, 2001 
Best lifecycle value is a concept rooted in value analysis, lifecycle consideration, and systems 
engineering which has evolved to support a holistic perspective of system development and program 
management. This thesis determines factors enabling consideration and achievement of lifecycle value 
by examining product development work. The scope of this effort focuses on aerospace programs to 
characterize lifecycle value for complex systems. Although different systems may define lifecycle value 
differently, there are common elements of the concept that have been identified. Based on four in-depth 
case studies and existing models, a theoretical framework for lifecycle value creation has been 
developed. The structure for this framework consists of three somewhat sequential and iterative 
processes: value identification, value proposition, and value delivery. Results from the case studies 
reported in the form of best practices have been related to this theoretical framework in six categories of 
value attributes. These attributes (holistic perspective, organizational factors, requirements and metrics, 
tools and methods, enterprise relationships, and leadership and management) apply to the entire lifecycle 
value framework. The combination of the framework and the practices from the case studies form a 
lifecycle value creation model, suggesting a lifecycle value approach encompasses appropriate and 
successful strategies for product development, system design, and program management. 
 
Managing Subsystem Commonality 
Matthew R. Nuffort, 2001 
 
Common systems satisfy the requirements of multiple platforms and meet designated architecture, 
performance, life cycle cost, and interface standards. Commercial industry has leveraged commonality 
strategies, such as modular and platform-based design, to reduce product development times and costs. 
This research seeks to understand whether similar strategies can apply to the defense aerospace 
industry. The work (1) explores the benefits and costs of increased subsystem commonality in the 
aerospace industry, (2) addresses when it is appropriate, and (3) examines the organizational structures 
necessary to achieve greater commonality. The analysis draws on eight case studies of both commercial 
and military aerospace organizations to address the three primary research topics from a total life cycle 
perspective. 
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While quantitative data on the benefits and costs of commonality in the defense aerospace industry is 
difficult to obtain, the case studies suggest that commonality can significantly reduce subsystem 
ownership costs by reducing both the cost of acquisition and the cost of operations and support. 
Subsystem commonality also increases mission effectiveness by reducing cycle time, improving reliability 
and availability, and guarding against diminishing manufacturing sources. The work indicates that 
commonality in the aerospace industry generally makes the most sense at the subsystem level, where 
different requirements are easier to reconcile and the strategy can have a significant impact on the 
logistics and supply systems. A common organization that manages across platforms, such as a product 
center of excellence, appears to offer the greatest potential advantage from commonality.  
 
The research reinforces the notion that strategies focusing only on the benefits of commonality in the 
acquisition phase of the life cycle are missing a significant portion of the holistic advantages of 
commonality from a system-level perspective. Platforms that deploy together and share common 
subsystems will likely have dramatically lower operations and support costs than platforms that might be 
common on the manufacturing floor but not in the field. 
 
Design Methods in the Aerospace Industry: Looking for Evidence of Set-Based Practices 
Joshua I. Bernstien, 1998 
 
A new paradigm in engineering design, known as set-based concurrent engineering (SBCE), has been 
proposed which seems to offer advantages over more traditional techniques. This research, therefore, 
had three goals: 1) to develop a clear understanding of the definition of SBCE and to contrast that 
definition with other theories, 2) to assess the "set-basedness" of the aerospace industry, and 3) based 
on the assessment, to propose a model for implementing SBCE within an aerospace development 
project. While set-based concurrent engineering consists of a wide variety of design techniques, the basic 
notions can be stated in two principles: 1) engineers should consider a large number of design 
alternatives, i.e., sets of designs, which are gradually narrowed to a final design, and 2) in a 
multidisciplinary environment, engineering specialists should independently review a design from their 
own perspectives, generate sets of possible solutions, and then look for regions of overlap between those 
sets to develop an integrated final solution.  This research found that while no company’s design process 
completely fulfilled both of these criteria, many set-based techniques are used within the aerospace 
industry. Building on some of the observed industry practices, a design process model is proposed which 
combines concepts from lean manufacturing, such as “flow” and “pull,” to implement set-based concurrent 
engineering. 
 
Reducing DoD Product Development Time: The Role of the Schedule Development Process 
Ross McNutt, 1998 
 
According to the Packard Commission, “Unreasonably long acquisition cycles -- ten to fifteen years for 
major weapon systems is a central problem from which most other acquisition problems stem.” Since the 
commission issued its report in 1986, the time required to develop new military systems has only grown. 
This research and its recommendations are intended to identify and eliminate the causes of those long 
development times for military systems. This report addresses a key factor in determining the 
development time for military projects: the project’s initial schedule. Part 1 outlines the current situation, 
previous efforts to reduce development time, and experiences with cutting development time in the 
commercial sector. It also documents the military product development process. Part 2 identifies a key 
area--the schedule development process, and its impact on development time--for in-depth research. 
Through understanding what is driving the initial project schedule and the impact of the initial project 
schedule on the eventual development time, the author identifies key drivers of development time. Part 3 
presents the results of three surveys and analyzes the processes used to develop a project’s initial 
schedule, the process used to develop a contracted schedule, and the impact of these schedules on 
actual development time. Part 4 presents observations, draws conclusions, and makes specific 
recommendations for remedial action. 
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The key barriers to reducing development time for military systems are the lack of importance placed on 
project schedules; the lack of effective schedule-based information and tools; the lack of schedule-based 
incentives; and the overriding impact of the funding-based limitations on defense projects. The steps 
necessary to establish a focus on reducing development time are: 1) recognizing the impact of 
development time, 2) providing the necessary information for decision makers, 3) providing proper 
incentives at each organizational level, and finally providing a structure to effectively manage the set of all 
development projects to ensure that each project can be funded based on its development related 
requirements. 
 
Implementing the recommendations and focusing on reducing development time will force other changes 
in the acquisition process. The focus on reducing the time to develop and field systems will drive the 
acquisition system to better meet the needs of our warfighters, more rapidly, and at lower cost. Better, 
Faster, and Cheaper. Even more importantly, shortening development times is critical to develop and 
produce with limited resources, the right weapons at the right time to deter or to defeat any potential 
enemy at any time with the minimum cost to our warfighters. 
 
 
MANAGEMENT & SUPPORT PROCESSES 
Risk Management  
Analysis of Key Characteristic Methods and Enablers Used in Variation Risk Management 
Ertan Basak, 1998 
Many engineering organizations, including aerospace companies, are using Key Characteristics (KCs) to 
manage the risk of variation in complex products during design through manufacturing. Effective KC 
implementation improves the quality of the product, reduces manufacturing variation, and reduces cost of 
design and manufacturing. The KC Maturity Model, which identifies twenty-two supporting practices for 
achieving optimal KC implementation, can be used by both high and low volume companies as a self-
assessment tool. This assessment can identify strengths and weaknesses in KC Practices.   
 
Through a series of benchmark studies, it was identified that high and low volume companies have 
different levels of implementation success. High and low volume KC implementation is examined using 
company assessments. The findings about implementation successes and deficiencies are coupled into 
support, identification, assessment, and mitigation practices. The importance of cross-functional teams for 
KC implementation is another significant finding which evolved through the research. 
 
Decision Analysis  
Utilization of Dependency Structure Matrix Analysis to Assess Implementation of NASA’s 
Complex Technical Projects 
Timothy J. Brady, 2002 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has built a great history for achieving 
remarkable success in accomplishing complex technical tasks. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, planetary 
spacecraft were sent throughout our solar system which provided close-up views of the planets. However, 
the 1990’s arrived with some project failures including a flaw in the Hubble Space Telescope’s primary 
mirror, and the loss of three spacecraft sent to Mars.  
 
Following the determination of the cause for the 1999 loss of Mars Climate Orbiter, the mishap 
investigation board reviewed eight previous failure investigation reports and identified a correlation 
between other project failures and a few common themes. The most common themes included 
inadequate project reviews, poor risk management, insufficient testing, and inadequate communications. 
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Most project managers are aware of the possibilities of and the consequences of these risk areas in 
complex technical projects – so why do many projects make these same mistakes? 
 
This thesis developed a framework for evaluating the long-term effect of early project implementation 
decisions. Early decisions, such as establishing a system architecture and selecting technology of 
particular maturity, can have lasting impact throughout the project development process and during the 
project’s operation phase. A systems engineering analysis framework using two different extensions of 
dependency structure matrix (DSM) analysis was developed to provide a comprehensive system view of 
the project architecture and the technology choices. An “interface DSM” mapped the dependence of 
components on one another and identified the impact of component criticality on the mission operations. 
 
A “technology risk DSM” included a component technology risk factor to help identify the patterns of 
system level risk. The ultimate goal of this thesis was to develop an analytical framework that could be 
used, along with other sound system engineering tools, to expand the management team’s holistic view 
of the project, which could then be used to enhance project implementation decision-making. The 
analytical framework developed in this thesis was applied to seven spacecraft projects which served as 
case studies. Successful and unsuccessful projects were included in the set of cases. Analytical 
observations were compared to post-project lessons learned to develop a general understanding of the 
relationship between the project structure and the implementation approach for each case. 
Strategic Technology Investment Decisions in Research & Development 
David I. Lackner, 1999 
 
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) is succumbing to pressures to operate more like 
a private entity than a government agency; however, modern business practices are rare in the 
organizational structure. NASA can install project evaluation and selection techniques like real options 
analysis to improve capital budgeting for technology projects. 
 
This thesis evaluates the current NASA best practices in place for technology investment decisions; 
evaluates the application of Real Options to the technology selection policy; and makes 
recommendations for the strategic management of the NASA portfolio and publicly funded R&D in 
general. 
 
The key insight is that a decision process can be established to fill the current vacuum and improve 
budget allocation, but that real options has two weaknesses that are particularly pronounced when 
applied to this sector. The first is the reliance on expert opinions for probabilities. The second is the 
necessity to place an absolute monetary value on outcomes. 
 
The difficulties are exacerbated by several factors: extremely long duration programs undermine 
estimates of expected benefits and R&D benefits are particularly intangible. Thus, for NASA, the Real 
Options tool is recommended considering the improvement over the current technology investment 
system. However, further work is required in tailoring the application to NASA’s special case, and 
therefore the general case of publicly funded R&D. A relevant improvement would require a rigorous 
method of obtaining consistent probabilities and technology valuations. 
 
Insights developed over the course of this study lead to a broader conclusion about the interaction of 
research & development with product development. Strengthening this connection with a tool such as real 
options will benefit the development activities by facilitating better capital budgeting decisions on focused 
technology solutions that are integrated into superior products. 
 
A Technology Development and Business Strategy: A Changing Environment Impacts Practices. 
Samuel P. Garbo, 1997 
Many high technology US manufacturing industries, and especially the aerospace industry are facing 
unparalleled world-wide competition in a new, faster-paced, cost-conscious, global marketplace. The 
process of new technology development, and its earliest introduction into product production programs, is 
undergoing major changes in almost all US firms as they restructure for this new global business 
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environment. These forces of change were studied relative to their impact on how technology planning is 
accomplished and its interaction with company business plans. Manufacturing industries were selected 
and historically reviewed. An industry background was created to list major business and strategy trends 
known to be occurring. Independently, selective industry interviews were performed to collect 
complementary data on current practices and changes ongoing. A literature survey was performed to 
summarize major academic theories regarding planning for needed technology development, and its 
required interaction with firm strategic (business) planning. Results were assessed relative to the 
adequacy of current practices to the business environment of the mid-1990's, and the changing role of 
technology in industry strategy. 
 
The Role of Product Development Metrics for Making Design Decisions in the Defense Aerospace 
Industry 
Todd M. Scout, 1996 
In current product development activities, many companies are unable to accurately predict the success 
of their efforts. This leads companies into dead-end development paths and often results in output that 
meets the contracted requirements for the program but fails to satisfy either the internal or external 
customers' needs. These problems arise primarily from one or more of three common problems during 
the development: failure to focus on the proper metrics and measurements of current activities; failure to 
maintain a significant historical database to facilitate corporate learning; and the use of a decision-making 
process that often lacks the information necessary to make good decisions.  
 
This thesis identifies these problems through three case studies of product modifications and upgrade 
development programs in the defense aircraft industry. From these cases and existing literature, 
examples of both good and poor practices are presented to support the basic conclusions. 
Causal Analysis 
Characterization of Operator-Reported Discrepancies in Unmanned On-Orbit Space Systems 
David Ferris, 2001 
 
The purpose of this research is to characterize the number and type of problems satellite operators 
encounter during the course of routine daily activities.  In the context of this paper, a discrepancy is 
defined as the perception by an operator that some portion of the space system has failed to operate as 
designed.  Discrepancies can therefore include ground system malfunctions, procedural errors, and even 
misdiagnosis that a problem exists, in addition to actual spacecraft anomalies.  The study is designed to 
test the following hypotheses using a verifiable, quantitative analysis: 1) the majority of problems 
encountered by an operator do not involve the spacecraft at all, but are attributed to other elements of the 
space system; and 2) correlations exist between aspects of a space system design and the nature of 
problems experienced by the operations staff over the long term.    
  
To perform an applied, rather than theoretical, analysis, several representative aerospace organizations 
provided historical discrepancy reports for satellites currently being flown.  Government civilian and 
military organizations participated in the study, which encompassed spacecraft from several mission 
areas, including remote sensing, research & development, communications, and observatories.  Raw 
discrepancy data was collected from each organization in the form of electronic databases or hand-
written logs.  Data conversion consisted of selecting similar fields of interest from each database; 
removing references to the program, organization, or spacecraft; replacing program-specific terminology 
with standardized nomenclature; and merging the individual databases into one data set.   
 
Statistical analysis of the entire data set was performed to test the two hypotheses above.The results of 
the analysis found that 13% of all discrepancies reported are associated with subsystems on board the 
spacecraft, while the remaining 87% are attributed to the operations infrastructure, including ground 
systems, communications relays, facilities, and associated equipment.  Correlations were found between 
certain design characteristics and the types of discrepancies reported for a given mission.  In addition, 
software problems were the root cause in an average 48% of the discrepancies reported for each 
mission.    
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Change Management 
Causes and Impacts of Class One Engineering Changes: An Exploratory Study Based on Three 
Defense Aircraft Acquisition Programs 
Teng-Cheng Shu, 1999 
Past studies on engineering changes have focused on products other than defense aerospace products, 
and have concentrated primarily on the design-manufacturing interface within single companies. Thus, 
engineering changes in the context of US defense aerospace product development - where the user 
community, the acquisition community, and the contractors share the responsibility for developing a 
product - remain largely unexplored. This research focused on three defense aircraft acquisition program 
case studies, referred to hereafter as Programs A, B, and C. The primary goal of these studies was to 
develop a better understanding of the causes and impacts of Class I engineering changes in the US 
defense aerospace product development context. Class I engineering changes, simply referred to as 
engineering changes below, are those that fundamentally modify the form, fit, and/or function of a product 
such that the results before and after the engineering changes are different, and are visible to all 
communities involved with developing the product. In addition, this research sought to identify ways in 
which contractors and customers may help to reduce the number of undesirable engineering changes.  
 
For the three case-study programs, requirements definition issues, changes in user needs, the need to fix 
deficiencies, and technological changes were found to be the four dominant causes of engineering 
changes. It was also found that program characteristics determined the dominant causes in each of the 
programs. Engineering changes due to the four dominant causes across the three case-study programs 
were found to be most likely of high-impact. The scope of impact of engineering changes remained 
relatively constant with respect to time, and engineering changes rarely led to subsequent, unanticipated 
engineering changes. Thorough requirements definition facilitated by the use of integrated product teams 
(IPTs), prioritization on program schedule, and the use of mature technologies combined to allow 
Program C to make frequent engineering changes to accommodate evolving user needs and changes in 
technology without any program schedule delay. It was also found that had IPTs been used during the 
development phases of Programs A and B, the prime contractors and their suppliers might have been 
able to avoid some engineering changes. 
Organization Innovation and Deployment 
Do Modern Tools Utilized in the Design and Development of Modern Aircraft Counteract the 
Impact of Lost Intellectual Capital within the Aerospace Industry 
W. Geoffrey Andrew, 2001 
 
Prior research has suggested that intellectual capital within the Aerospace Industry has been in decline. 
The new design aircraft experience base of Post WWIV Aerospace Engineers was approximately 6-12 
new design aircraft per career. In contrast, an aerospace engineer starting his career today may 
experience only one, maybe two new aircraft designs during their career. Anecdotal evidence has been 
published linking this trend to problems experienced in many recent aircraft programs. Counter 
arguments cite rapid advances in design, manufacturing and information technologies used in the design 
and development process of today's new design aircraft have compensated for some or all of declining 
experience base. This thesis focuses on exploring the validity of this counter argument. 
 
Program performance metrics were established and utilized to draw comparisons between programs. In 
addition, extensive interviews with personnel who played roles in these programs were conducted to that 
the root cause in areas of differing performance were understood. 
 
Analysis of the data gathered revealed that the predecessor programs outperformed the more recent 
programs. Recommendations regarding ways to mitigate intellectual capital performance gap are 
presented. 
 
Compiled by: Lean Aerospace Initiative  
Research Group at MIT  
 
June 2004 – version 5.0 16 
Organization Environment for Integration 
 
Transforming A New Product Development Organization: A Systems Engineering Deployment 
Case Study 
Chandra Kay Stich Wozniak, 2002 
 
This thesis studies the deployment of a systems engineering balanced product development organization 
in two new product development case studies. The study involved the development of a tool to evaluate 
the systems engineering process maturity achieved within the two organizations and an organizational 
driver analysis using a strategic, political and cultural framework. These evaluations provided data for 
comparing the level of maturity and functionality the two organizations had achieved as their development 
efforts unfolded. Additionally the organizational driver data provided a holistic perspective from which the 
author could make observations on how the development efforts were influenced by the systems 
engineering deployment. Several observations were high-lighted as having a significant influence on the 
amount of value the systems organizations were able to provide the new product development teams. 
Additionally recommendations were made on how the organizations can use these findings to reach 
higher levels of systems engineering capability. The list below includes the most significant observations: 
• Despite dramatically different product outcomes the two teams achieved approximately the same 
level of systems engineering process maturity. 
• Both NPD teams had limited visibility and or understanding of systems engineering as a 
discipline. 
• Both NPD teams were not fundamentally enabled with prescriptive processes and lack 
knowledge or exposure to the world of process maturity and process improvement. 
• The perceived success of the systems engineering organization was strongly influenced by the 
difference in program drivers in commercial and military product development environments. 
• Both NPD teams were focused on accomplishing the tasks of systems engineering and did not 
leverage / engage a holistic view of systems engineering on the projects. 
• The system teams provided the tasks of systems engineering that directly support product 
development with the most attention and critical support mechanisms of systems engineering 
were either overlooked or neglected by the teams. 
• The system engineering organizational structure deployed in the NPD organizations creates a 
check and balance arrangement between program drivers and technical accomplishment. 
• The immaturity of the systems engineering organization makes it highly sensitive to political and 
cultural influences. 
 
These observations influence the amount of value new product development teams are able to extract 
from the systems engineering structure. Additionally, they illuminate the challenges faced by mature 
organizations as they attempt to adopt an organizational systems perspective and transform their new 
product development operations. 
 
Organizational Characteristics for Successful Product Line Engineering 
Michelle T. Beckert, 2000 
 
The evaluation of strategic, political, and cultural characteristics at four organizations implementing 
product line engineering (PLE) was conducted. The objective was to identify non-technical characteristics 
that attribute to successful product line engineering efforts. A set of questions structured around defined 
strategic, political, and cultural characteristics was generated for formal evaluation of each organization, 
and then a series of interviews within each organization was performed to gather case study data. 
 
Two of the four organizations studied were identified as being more successful with product line 
engineering, and, thus, were used as the basis for comparison. A comparative analysis of the 
organizations was performed to observe noteworthy characteristics that attributed to success. Some of 
the key observations include: 
 
• Strategic plans clearly defined goals relating to the development of product lines 
• Metrics were used that applied specifically to product line engineering 
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• PLE strategies were implemented uniformly across the organization 
• The smallest percent of projects for each organization utilized the new design strategy 
• Organizing resources around platforms, using modular system architectures, and implementing 
initiatives to standardize components facilitated resource and technology sharing 
• By defining and enforcing product line strategies, senior management enabled successful product 
line engineering In summary, the study indicated that an organization needs strategic 
characteristics in place to serve as the foundation from which to implement product line 
engineering. 
 
Senior management (i.e., a political characteristic) is an extension of the foundation largely because it 
defines the embodied strategy and enforces it. It is imperative for senior management to provide the 
power and resources that will enable a product line engineering culture – it is the primary link from 
strategy to culture. The cultural characteristics are the means by which strategies and goals are 
implemented and product development is executed. A PLE culture will not succeed if a strategic 
foundation and a political constituent do not fundamentally uphold it. 
 
PROJECT/ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
Project Planning  
Improving the Management of System Development to Produce More Affordable Military Avionics 
Systems  
Jeremy P. Tondreault, 2003 
This thesis aims to improve the management of system development to deliver more affordable systems. 
Improving affordability is investigated from the avionics supplier’s perspective. An affordable system is 
defined as meeting customer needs for performance and lifecycle cost in an over-constrained program 
space where initial development budget, schedule, performance and lifecycle cost goals are not all 
achievable. In certain segments of the military avionics market, the nature of competition is changing from 
performance to affordability based. Firms that develop competitive advantage in delivering affordable 
systems can capture market share. 
 
This research is different than most literature published on affordability because it focuses on design 
innovation as opposed to product development and manufacturing efficiency through Lean, Six-Sigma or 
other techniques. Lean and Six-Sigma are necessary to improve system affordability but not sufficient to 
develop competitive advantage because they can be implemented by anyone on any system concept. 
Competitive advantage requires benefits from Lean and Six-Sigma and design innovations focused on 
affordability. Step function type improvements can be realized through system architecture and module 
design innovations that strike a better balance between lifecycle cost and performance. 
 
Four areas are investigated: the nature of development focus during each design iteration, the role of 
requirements, managing lifecycle cost as a design requirement and effective integration of downstream 
knowledge into the design. 
 
A model for developing requirements that strikes a better balance between performance and lifecycle cost 
is suggested – treating lifecycle cost as a design requirement and explicitly focusing on understanding the 
cost-performance trade space before developing requirements. A product development model is 
suggested – focusing on achieving lifecycle cost goals first and using iterations to grow performance can 
lead to lower cost solutions. Both the requirements development and product development models 
require leveraging prior knowledge, technology and capability. The requirements model requires high 
knowledge of system cost drivers and achievable performance. The product development model requires 
low technical risk allowing the team to focus on affordability first without running unacceptable levels of 
performance risk. Methods for increasing the effective integration of downstream knowledge are also 
discussed. 
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System Dynamics Modeling for the Exploration of Manpower Project Staffing Decisions in the 
Context of a Multi-Project Enterprise 
Karl E. Pilon, 2001 
 
At the Sikorsky Aircraft and Xerox Corporations, project decisions may be made on a project to project 
basis and often neglect to account for the complex interactions that exist between projects. Often the 
current decision process results in a less than optimal return to the corporation. This return may be 
measured in terms of organizational capability or intellectual capital. Exploration of the effects of 
decisions with regard to the allocation of manpower in a multiple engineering project setting is required. 
Also, an understanding is required as to how these daily decisions effect the development of 
organizational capability or intellectual capital.  
 
The authors propose to describe and model the product development processes currently in use at the 
Sikorsky Aircraft and Xerox Corporations. The system dynamics method has been employed extensively 
in the development and application of single project models. However, the application of the system 
dynamics method in the understanding of multi-project systems is limited. The authors developed an 
original multi-project model, utilizing the Vensim toolkit, which permits the exploration of manpower 
resource allocation decisions based on experience of current practice at the Sikorsky Aircraft and Xerox 
Corporations. This model was exercised to determine the effects of proactive and reactive resource 
allocation decisions on an organization's ability to complete projects and expand intellectual capital. This 
learning environment will further the understanding of management at both organizations. 
 
Methodologies learned from the various aspects of the System Design and Management curriculum 
served the purpose of problem framing and provided validation that a multi-project system dynamics 
model would serve as a valuable decision support tool. This holistic perspective provides a basis for 
process improvement and the development of recommendations applicable to the Sikorsky Aircraft and 
Xerox Corporations. 
 
Recommendations for policy change are categorized with respect to anticipated payback in the near-
term, intermediate and long-term time horizons. Near-term recommendations relate to overtime and 
project prioritization. Policies regarding resource allocation at the beginning and end of projects, as well 
as a project cancellation policy comprise the intermediate term recommendations. Long-term 
recommendations include policy that emphasizes scheduling projects with a gap between and a policy 
that seeks portfolio balance based on intellectual capital growth as well as monetary return on 
investment. 
 
Spacecraft System-Level Integration and Test Discrepancies: Characterizing Distributions and 
Costs  
Annalisa L. Weigel, 2000 
 
The goal of this research is to characterize the distribution and costs of spacecraft discrepancies found at 
the system level of integration and test, as well as understand the implications of those distributions and 
costs for the spacecraft enterprise as a whole. If discrepancies can be better understood, they can 
potentially be reduced or even eliminated. Reducing discrepancies will result in cycle time reduction and 
cost savings, as well as increased product quality and reliability. All of these potential outcomes are 
indications of successful progress toward becoming a lean organization. 
 
Data on discrepancies at the system level of integration were gathered from spacecraft vendor 
databases, while interviews with key program managers and engineers provided perspective and insight 
into the data. Results are based on 224 spacecraft representing at least 20 different programs or product 
lines, and encompassing 23,124 discrepancies. The spacecraft date from 1973-1999, and represent 
different vendors as well as a mix of commercial and government spacecraft. 
 
Spacecraft discrepancies are analyzed in this work on the basis of ten categories: the spacecraft mission, 
the spacecraft subsystem where the discrepancy occurred, the date of the discrepancy occurrence, the 
discrepancy report open duration, the immediate action taken to fix the discrepancy (disposition), the root 
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cause of the discrepancy, the long-term corrective action prescribed to prevent the discrepancy from 
happening again on future spacecraft, the labor time spent on the discrepancy, and the cycle time lost 
due to the discrepancy. Statistical measures of central tendency, correlation and normality are presented 
for each category. This statistical analysis forms the basis for research findings at the enterprise level in 
the areas of quality yield, resource utilization, stakeholder satisfaction and flow time. Recommendations 
to enterprise stakeholders for increasing the value derived from system level integration and test follow 
from the enterprise-level findings. 
Modeling and Analyzing Cost, Schedule, and Performance in Complex System Product 
Development 
Tyson R. Browning, 1998 
In the future, it is unlikely that complex system products will compete solely on the basis of technical 
performance. What will differentiate such systems and their developers is the ability to balance all the 
dimensions of product performance, including product pricing and timing (which are functions inclusive of 
development cost and cycle time). Furthermore, this balance must be congruent with customers' 
perceptions of value. Once this value is ascertained or approximated, complex system developers will 
require the capability to adjust the design process to meet these expectations. The required amount and 
sophistication of project planning, control, information, and flexibility is unprecedented. The primary goal 
of this work is a method to help managers integrate process and design information in a way that 
supports making decisions that yield products congruent with customer desires and strategic business 
goals.  
  
This work consists of three parts. Part one contains two exploratory studies that further understanding of 
complex system product development processes. One study explores process iteration and seeks to 
explain why some aircraft development programs do not address iteration with existing project planning 
and control methods. The other study examines sources of risk, classifying these into six categories (cost, 
schedule, performance, technology, business, and market risks) and building causal frameworks to 
represent their relationships. Both studies point to avenues for improving existing process models and in 
some cases reveal process characteristics requiring new methods. These results, while derived from 
projects in the aerospace industry, are highly applicable across a variety of complex system development 
projects. 
 
Part two entails an effort to model some of the characteristics observed in part one. After a review of four 
types of dependency structure matrices (DSMs), notably the activity-based or schedule DSM, extensive 
data are collected from an uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) design process. Part two thus describes how 
to build a DSM model and provides data for example applications of the detailed models developed in 
part three. 
 
Based on the foundational work of parts one and two, part three develops a new methodology and 
models for understanding product development process cost, schedule, and performance. The 
methodology complements activity-centric schedule models such as DSM in that activities provide direct 
contributions to process cost and schedule and design performance. 
  
This approach sets the stage for integrated cost, schedule, and performance analyses. A cost and 
schedule model is presented first, and it is extended to account for the effects of activities on product 
performance. The stochastic, simulation model generates distributions of possible cost, schedule, and 
performance outcomes. These distributions represent uncertainty and are analyzed in relation to impact 
functions and targets to determine levels of risk. The model outputs enable the exploration of the costs 
and benefits of several management options and yield interesting insights. The goal is to improve product 
development planning and control though the capability to balance cost, schedule, and performance 
appropriately. 
 
Integrated Product Teams 
Challenges and Benefits to the Implementation of Integrated Product Teams on Large Military 
Procurements. 
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Christopher M. Hernandez, 1996 
Tens of millions of dollars will be spent by the United States Air Force and Navy over the next several 
years on the development and production of our country's top military weapon systems. The most senior 
leadership of these government agencies have committed their organizations to proceed with this 
development using a concept of management known as Integrated Product Development (IPD) using 
Integrated Product Teams (IPT). Essentially, the majority of the US aerospace community is moving 
towards this new concept of management. Since this concept comes from the commercial industry, the 
underlying factors of the way commercial industry does business versus aerospace, need to be explored 
to ensure that a model of IPD/IPT is developed which is optimized for the US aerospace industry. This 
thesis looks at this issue for four ongoing major aircraft developments: B-2 Bomber, C-17 Transport, F/A-
18 E/F Fighter, and F-22 Fighter. These four programs are reviewed and contrasted to commercial 
business practices to bring out structural differences that may act as barriers to IPT Implementation. 
Several areas were identified that impede its implementation. These areas include: training, team budget 
control, and the need for balance between teams and functions. In addition, details of how benefits can 
be derived from the IPT concept are discussed. Current methods being used to measure these benefits 
are presented. 
Systematic IPT Integration in Lean Development Programs. 
Tyson R. Browning, 1996 
Integrated Product Development (IPD) is a crucial aspect of the lean paradigm. The drive towards IPD 
includes an impetus to organize around Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). The use of IPTs has brought 
with it many issues, including those at the IPT interfaces. Program integration (of a cross-functional, 
upstream/downstream nature) can exist at three levels: (1) within the IPTs, (2) between the IPTs in 
system level teams, and (3) between the IPTs and system level teams in the program at large. This work 
focuses on the second and third levels, the realm of IPT interdependence, and categorizes several 
Integrative Mechanisms (IMs) to facilitate interteam integration. IMs are strategies and tools for effectively 
coordinating actions across teams within a program. To provide a variety of contexts for investigation in 
the defense aircraft industry, the thesis includes five case studies of development programs of varying 
size from each of several sectors. Each is analyzed for its use of IMs. To give a systematic basis for 
designing the design process, the application of the Design Structure Matrix (DSM) to model program 
organization based on information flow is considered in one case. DSM-based approaches to interface 
management have been used in the automotive and other industries. They can help a systems 
engineer/manager systematize the interface management process, both at a product level and at an 
interteam level. This facilitates decisions as to the correct utilization of IMs. These studies provide the 
basis for lean principles of program integration, which include designing a program for integration. 
Inter-group Coordination 
Multidisciplinary Design Problem Solving on Product Development  
Joshua Bernstien, 2001 
 
This investigation, conducted under the auspices of the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI), studied how 
engineers from different specialties interpret and communicate about technical design problems while 
working on product development teams. Data was collected on 98 cases via interviews with engineers at 
LAI member companies. For approximately one-third of the cases, two engineers with different 
backgrounds were interviewed, allowing comparisons to be made between their descriptions of the 
problems under study. For the remaining cases, one interview was conducted per case. The most 
important finding of this study was that engineers from different specialties do interpret the same problem 
differently. Specifically, two engineers were likely to evaluate the benefits or drawbacks of a potential 
solution using different sets of criteria. Thus, some design disputes were the result not of mutually 
exclusive needs but of a failure to recognize the different ways in which engineers were evaluating 
solutions to the problem. Furthermore, data collected during this study illustrated that in some cases 
these differences were the result of engineers addressing related, but unique problems. Therefore, a 
solution to one engineer’s problem often created a new problem for another engineer on the team. 
 
A second conclusion of this study was that how design tools were used had a greater impact on a team’s 
problem solving abilities than what tool was used. In this context, design tools included objects such as 
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real or “virtual” prototypes as well as processes like simulations and tests. The results of this investigation 
suggested that such tools offered their greatest benefits when they were used in a participatory fashion in 
which a large fraction of a team shared in their use. Additionally, the more elements of a problem’s 
context that were captured in a design tool, the greater its utility. Under such conditions, team members 
were able to create a shared evaluation system to judge potential solutions to the problem they were 
confronting, thereby facilitating problem resolution. 
 
Based on these results, the traditional model of engineering communication derived from the information 
processing framework requires modification. The information processing model assumes that individuals 
have a shared understanding of meaning when they communicate. This study, however, suggests that 
such shared understandings do not exist in advance, but are instead created as part of the 
communication process. While the information processing model may work well to explain communication 
patterns at a high level or within a well-established group, a model that accounts for the active and 
dynamic creation of shared meaning is more appropriate at a detailed level.  
Supplier Management  
Supplier Management Practices of the Joint Direct Attack Munition Program. 
Malee V. Lucas, 1996 
US defense aerospace contractors have been in the process of reducing the supplier base and 
delegating greater responsibilities to key suppliers in order to remain competitive in the face of defense 
cutbacks. The trend towards greater outsourcing has meant that new products and modifications of 
existing systems are being designed, developed, and produced by first tier and lower tier suppliers. 
Supplier management becomes increasingly important as suppliers take on a greater role in product 
development. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) program reveals changes in the model for supplier 
relationships in the defense aerospace industry that have been accompanied by unprecedented results. 
The joint Air Force and Navy program was designated a Defense Acquisition Pilot Program by the 
Department of Defense to implement acquisition reform -- particularly the reform measures of the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. Changes in decision-making, program structure, and organizational 
culture occurred as the result of reform measures and the product development administration of the 
program. The changes implemented by the Government as well as the innovative supplier management 
practices of the prime contractor showed progress in the general model for supplier relationships towards 
a more collaborative, team-oriented partnership. The JDAM program not only reveals the use of a new 
model for supplier relationships and management but also reveals that the underlying corporate 
strategies of subcontractor firms influenced the types of information exchanged within the program. 
Limitations in certain types of information exchanged, however, did not necessarily limit subcontractor 
contributions to product development and to program affordability goals. It was also revealed that the 
dynamics behind JDAM team formation influenced the type of innovation in development of the Guidance 
Control Unit. The linkages of the suppliers and the supplier designs resulted in innovations that changed 
the system architecture. In future programs, the Government, prime contractors, and suppliers may be 
able to manage the types of resulting designs and innovations by focusing on team dynamics and inter-
relationships. 
 
 
SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESSES  
Acquisition Practices  
Product Development Strategies in Evolutionary Acquisition  
Bobak Ferdowsi, 2003 
 
Programs are consistently faced with the decision on how to best deliver capabilities to the user. This 
challenge is magnified by the number of uncertainties and risks the program can expect throughout the 
product development process—that is the means by which the program gets from perceived need to 
deliverable solution. The Air Force, as a result of increasing development times for new products, has 
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decided to implement an Evolutionary Acquisition strategy, meaning the development process focuses on 
delivering incremental capabilities through short increments or spirals. 
 
The question, however, is whether this strategy makes sense across the broad spectrum of Air Force 
programs. More importantly, how can the Air Force, and aerospace programs in general, decide what 
product development strategy applies to each program? An extensive literature review yielded a number 
of relevant questions regarding product development. The hypothesis of this research is that this 
selection should be based on attributes of the product, the program goals, the uncertainties, and 
stakeholder involvement. 
 
A number of case studies were performed specifically targeting programs identified as evolutionary. 
Analysis of these case studies showed that there was a disparity among these programs as to what was 
meant by Evolutionary Acquisition. These programs were shown to have a mix of strategies, but primarily 
followed a pattern of creating upgrades to a baseline or platform. From the case studies a number of key 
recommendations were made for program managers and policy makers implementing Evolutionary 
Acquisition, as well as a notional illustration of product development selection. Specifically, the research 
found that programs with high user requirements uncertainty tended towards more iteration, while 
programs with significant technical and performance goals had less iteration and greater planning. In 
programs where rapid delivery was the goal and uncertainties were relatively low, incremental strategies 
were found to be most applicable. 
 
Recommendations included implementing open architecture systems through owning system interfaces, 
managing stakeholder expectations through system representations and internal change agents, and 
providing stable funding and contingency funds for rapid change implementation. Additional 
recommendations were made on implementing testing and logistics in highly iterative programs. 
 
Architecting Evolutionary Strategies Using Spiral Development for Space Based Radar 
Christopher James Roberts, 2003 
 
The Department of Defense has identified the Space Based Radar (SBR) Program as a candidate for 
Evolutionary Acquisition to be implemented by the Spiral Development process.  However, Spiral 
Development was originally developed in the software industry, and a consensus has not emerged about 
its applicability to space systems.  In addition, space systems typically have not been developed with 
explicit considerations of architectural modularity and scalability, features necessary to enable 
evolutionary acquisition strategies.     
 
A stakeholder based system architecting process known as Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration 
(MATE) provides a framework for combining computer based modeling and simulation of complex 
engineering systems with decision theory.  The MATE process has been successfully applied to several 
space system projects, yielding illustrative trades analysis along the dimensions of utility and cost.  
However, no previous attempt has been made to incorporate the schedule dimension, a step that is 
critical for architecting evolutionary strategies. 
 
Qualitative comparisons between software systems and SBR in the context of spiral development 
suggest a fundamental difference in system evolution and risk mitigation strategies, yet found the Spiral 
Development and Evolutionary Acquisition framework to be suitable to SBR.  A quantitative MATE SBR 
software model enabled an analysis of architectural modularity and scalability, successfully incorporated 
the addition of the schedule dimension, and demonstrated the concept of acquisition tradespace 
exploration.  
 
These analyses led to insights regarding the objectives, challenges, and limitations of applying computer 
based modeling and simulation as a tool for Spiral Development of evolutionary complex engineering 
systems.   
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Finally, policy recommendations for improving cost accounting, key stakeholder participation, and 
evolutionary options analysis were made based on findings of the research.  
 
Make-Buy Decisions in the U.S. Aircraft Industry 
Robert K. Perrons, 1997 
 
The U.S. aircraft industry is going through a process of rapid and fundamental transformation on many 
levels. Drastic changes in both the level and composition of customer demand for commercial as well as 
military aircraft, a frenzy of consolidations in the industry, the emergence of lean manufacturing, and the 
“globalization” of supplier networks are making the aerospace sector very different from what it used to 
be. But the new realities of the industry go further than merely redefining the role of the independent 
aircraft company in its changing environment; they are also reshaping the very boundaries of each firm in 
the aircraft sector. It is therefore crucial for managers in the industry to understand one of the principal 
mechanisms by which a company controls the scope of its in-house activities: make-buy decisions. 
 
This thesis approaches the topic of make-buy decisions in the U.S. aircraft industry in four ways. One, it 
offers insight into the circumstances and criteria behind make-buy decisions in the industry by examining 
two case studies involving commercial and defense products, respectively. The case studies focus as 
well on the vertical relationships among the companies examined, and how these relationships are 
realigned as a result of the prime's make-buy decisions. Two, this thesis proposes a framework that 
explains ex post how managers in the industry decide to make or buy a particular component or process, 
and that provides guidelines for approaching future make-buy decisions. The framework concentrates on 
two major factors that play key roles in the aircraft sector's make-buy judgments: the degree of 
technological maturity of the component or process, and the relative competitive market position of a firm 
with respect to the particular technology underlying the component or process. Three, this thesis 
recommends a make and buy strategy that large companies in the industry should consider for securing 
and maintaining a leading role in their respective core competencies. Four, it addresses the principal 
ways in which the aircraft industry's make-buy decisions may be affected by or may eventually lead to 
changes in the policies of the U.S. government. 
 
A Study of the Federal Government's Experiences with Commercial. 
Michael Anderson, 1997 
The continual decline in our country's defense budget has severely impacted both government and the 
defense industry. To cope, the government has increasingly relied on the use of commercial procurement 
practices, a central tenet of federal acquisition reform. This thesis examines the impact of new 
commercial procurement practices from the perspective of the average defense acquisition manager. 
Using research information gathered from 23 current defense acquisition programs which used 
commercial procurement practices successfully, the thesis identifies specific practices in use, documents 
lessons learned from practice implementation, and investigates five core hypotheses regarding the direct 
impact of the practices on acquisition costs, schedule, quality, life cycle support, and life cycle costs. 
 
From a vast array of possible business practices, thesis research identified eight specific practices that 
are permitted by existing policies and actively promoted within the government. Analysis of data from 23 
programs found that four practices were employed by a majority of programs surveyed. Likewise research 
revealed that almost half of the programs reported uncertainty with item performance as the most critical 
risk posed by commercial procurement practices and the challenge of cultural acceptance as the greatest 
obstacle to implementation. In addition, a program type analysis concluded that munitions and systems 
acquisition programs were the most active users of commercial procurement practices. On average, 
these programs used four or more specific practices per program, while in comparison aircraft programs 
on average used less than four practices and vessel programs averaged less than three. 
 
After thorough analysis, the research data provided evidence to support all five thesis hypotheses. Data 
showed that commercial procurement practices indeed reduced program acquisition costs by 4.3% and 
afforded indirect savings by enabling substantial staff reductions and cost/performance decision making. 
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In addition to cost reductions, it was found that the practices directly achieved a 17 month average 
program schedule reduction. In general, the majority of acquisition managers surveyed concluded that the 
use of commercial procurement practices actually improves product quality, does not degrade life cycle 
support, and does not increase life cycle costs. 
 
An examination of common themes in the use of commercial procurement practices concluded that five 
practices accounted essentially for all reported program cost and schedule reductions. In conclusion, the 
thesis accomplished all intended goals. The thesis provided evidence to support the five core hypotheses, 
therefore substantiating acquisition reform rhetoric regarding the value of commercial procurement 
practices. In addition, the thesis revealed valuable managerial insights into the actual benefits and risks of 
commercial procurement practices and offered proven strategies for implementing the practices. 
 
A System Dynamics Analysis of the Interaction Between the U.S. Government and the Defense 
Aerospace Industry. 
Michelle V. Bakilla, 1996 
 
The defense aerospace industry is experiencing a dramatic decrease in product orders due to the 
downsizing of the U.S. military. Industry leaders have recognized a need to reduce both the cost and 
cycle time of defense aircraft design, development, and production while maintaining product 
performance, quality, and corporate profitability. As a result, several aerospace companies, the 
Department of Defense, and researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have formed a 
consortium - the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI). The LAI goal is to identify the path for implementation of 
"best" practices into the aerospace industry and the government departments with which they interact. 
This thesis investigates the interaction of the government and the defense aerospace industry during the 
military procurement cycle. This interaction is demonstrated by analyzing the defense procurement 
system and the industry product development process using system dynamics principles. The resulting 
System Dynamics model identifies and seeks to quantify the interaction between the two organizations. 
The model interactions are calibrated against a recent military development project and the effects of 
variables on project performance and investigated through sensitivity analysis. 
 
"Critical Examination of a Complex and Critical Major Acquisition for the Department of Defense: 
The Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAM).",  
James F. Robbins, 1994 
In 1976, a group of United States Air Force and United States Navy fighter aircraft pilots told the 
acquisition professionals of the Armament Development and Test Center at Eglin Air Force Base in 
Florida the operational requirements for a new, lightweight air-to-air missile. They dreamed that the 
engineers and scientists of the US aerospace community could put an entire radar system more powerful 
than most aircraft radar into a 7-inch diameter and that the resulting missile would let them launch 
multiple missiles at multiple enemy aircraft from beyond visual range. As of March 1994, the operational 
forces have received over 3,000 missiles that surpass all expectations in performance and reliability. This 
thesis is a case study of the acquisition strategy and Government organization that the Department of 
Defense used to acquire the AMRAAM system. The AMRAAM program is explained and analyzed from a 
managerial perspective from the genesis of the operational requirements until March of 1994. Positive 
and negative lessons learned, as well as critical programmatic issues, are described for research and 
development, introduction of production competition through a leader/follower technique, pre-planned 
product improvements to sustain system performance well beyond the year 2010, management in the 
joint-service environment, and multi-national participation. The thesis concludes with alternative 
acquisition strategies that the Air Force has for the AMRAAM program. The road to AMRAAM's success 
as a program was long and difficult. Current and future Department for Defense programs will be 
benchmarked against the AMRAAM accomplishments. 
Incentives  
Economic Incentives in Aerospace Weapon Systems Procurement 
Stacey A. Kowap, 1998 
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In the last several years, policy makers have attempted to make changes in the defense acquisition 
system to allow for a structure that provides for the selection and budgeting of the most cost-effective 
weapons. Senior Department of Defense officials are attempting to shift away from regulation and 
oversight and towards economic incentives for the procurement of higher quality and lower cost weapon 
systems. This thesis provides a framework for the establishment of incentives within an aerospace 
weapon system program. The objective of this thesis is to provide a framework for government and 
contractor program managers to develop economic incentives in the future. Changing acquisition policies 
challenge program managers as they attempt to structure procurement contracts that meet government 
and company goals and objectives. The framework developed highlights the critical link between the 
management processes within a weapon system acquisition program and the establishment of economic 
incentives.  Practices are described that help identify, quantify and foster the development of incentives. 
 
The practices discussed derive from four case studies completed as part of this thesis. These case 
studies document how each program established their economic incentives, and show they were not 
simply derived from a formula used in the government’s weighted guidelines (WGL) for profits, or other 
procurement directive or list. Each program’s economic incentives are tied to risks specific to the 
completion of that weapon system. Programs that successfully use economic incentives capture the 
major risks to execution of their weapon system program and plan for methods to mitigate those risks. 
